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Every once in a while, political events either take on a life of their own, out of
the hands of those introducing or seeking to control them, or appear to be so
unbelievably timely as if scripted by a poor drama undergraduate. The changes that
are planned to public order law – in effect the ‘law of protest’ – in England and Wales
by the Conservative Government satisfy both.
The changes in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill were first introduced
into Parliament – the first time MPs set their eyes on them – on Tuesday 9 March.
They came back before MPs again, for the 2nd reading – the main Parliamentary
debate on the floor of the House of Commons – on Monday and Tuesday this week,
15-16 March. In the interim, the media has shown scenes of strong, forceful policing
in London at the ‘Reclaim the Night’ vigil to mark the murder of Sarah Everard last
week, who was killed while walking home. Media images have gone around the
world so most will be aware that a peaceful vigil – attended by many hundreds –
ended with officers wading in, making arrests, using batons and indeed actually
trampling on the flowers and signs laid in her memory. MPs will have had a week,
at best, to scrutinise the provisions. It is a massive Bill, covering a portmanteau
of topics. Among its 307 pages and 176 clauses (which will become sections if it
is passed), the public order provisions number just ten pages and seven clauses,
clauses 54-60.
Those public order provisions have the capacity drastically to re-orientate the
relationship between citizen and state in favour of the latter. The Bill takes little or no
account of the important role protest plays in a free society – as a safety valve, as a
means to seek change, or simply as collective expressions of solidarity or grief, as
we saw in London last weekend. As former Prime Minister Teresa May, certainly not
known as a soft liberal, put it during the debate on the Bill on Monday: “freedom of
speech is an important right in our democracy, however annoying or uncomfortable
that might sometimes be. I know that there will be people who will have seen scenes
of protests and asked, “Why aren’t the Government doing something?” The answer,
in many cases, may simply be that we live in a democratic, free society.”
I argue that the Bill is unbalanced, unnecessary – in that many of its planned
changes seek to plug non-existent gaps – and unprincipled.
Background
The policing of protests in the UK involves a mish-mash of powers. Some are
straightforwardly criminal – arrests for offences such as obstructing the highway
without reasonable excuse – while some are more administrative, such as the power
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to impose conditions on both marches and static assemblies. Most are to be found
in statutes, passed by Parliament, while a few powers – powers to prevent a breach
of the peace – are found in judge-made common law. Protests, of course, come in
many different forms and the law, and policing, need to respond to both large scale
‘traditional’ marches and acts of non-violent direct action such as lock-ons and sit-
ins.
The UK has witnessed two main forms of protest in the past year. First have
been Extinction Rebellion (XR) disruptions springing up across many cities, but
mostly in London; second has been various Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests,
especially those directed at pulling down statues that connect back to slavery
but do not acknowledge it. The mood music has been police publicly proclaiming
their impotence at dealing with either – the Metropolitan Police lost a High Court
challenge to its policing of the XR protests across London in October 2019 – and a
populist political bandwagon to be jumped upon, tapping in to public disquiet, actual
or constructed, at the threats to “rewrite British history” that pulling down statues is
said to embody.
The proposals in outline
These proposals are the first major changes planned to public order legislation since
1986 when the current legislation, the Public Order Act 1986 (POA), was passed.
Major features of the Bill include:
• A new, fourth trigger for the power to impose conditions on both public
processions and assemblies, one based on noisiness. The existing triggers in
the POA 1986 are that an officer reasonably believes there might be serious
damage to property; serious public disorder; or serious disruption to the life of
the community. So, if the Bill is passed, if the noise generated by those taking
part either (i) may result in serious disruption to an organisation’s activities –
such as its business – in the vicinity or (ii) may have a significant and relevant
impact on people in the vicinity, that is it might intimidate or harass them, or
cause them to suffer serious unease, alarm or distress, then the senior officer at
the scene can impose such conditions as appear necessary to prevent it. The
Bill does not specify but we might assume this would include limits on number,
on route, on time, on volume. It cannot be an actual ban – that has a different
framework – but the effects could amount to something very close: five people
for ten minutes two miles away.
• A new power to take action against one-person protests on grounds of noise, as
above. Previously, it needed two people to constitute an “assembly”, a number
that was reduced in 2003 from twenty.
• Adding to the prohibited activities that are not permitted in and around
Westminster – currently, broadly speaking having amplified noise equipment
and tents/overnight sleeping equipment – that of obstructing vehicles coming
into and out of the House of Commons or House of Lords.
• Replacing the common law offence of causing a public nuisance, with a wider
statutory offence of intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance, defined
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as including acts that are or risk being “seriously annoying” to a section of the
public.
• Conferring on the Home Secretary a power to make Regulations (that is,
legislation but with almost no parliamentary input or scrutiny) governing the
meaning of “serious disruption to the life of the community” and the new “serious
disruption to the activities of an organisation” carried on in the vicinity
Comment
Why then are there concerns? The most obvious point to make is that they represent
just the latest in a one-way street, of government acting to restrict the right to protest
– that is, acting to restrict the right to oppose, to make known your views collectively.
Put like that, it is not a surprise. It is a brave politician who would willingly concede
that.
It is not all one way – in 1998, Parliament, under a Labour Government, passed the
Human Rights Act to give domestic effect to the ECHR, and thus to Article 11. That
was very welcome, of course, and marked a sea-change in both judicial and political
approaches to how they conceive and protect protesters. It is though the only
positive legislative change of any substance since 1936. Every other intervention
by the legislature has empowered the police and reduced the rights of citizens. It
is thus, though this remains a valid criticism, no surprise that there is no sense of a
requirement that officers act proportionately – necessity is the touchstone for policing
decisions and intervention an (obviously) much lesser threshold. To some extent,
that problem is ameliorated by the presence of the notion of ‘proportionality’ infused
within human rights jurisprudence and thus through the Human Rights Act. Courts
are, and will be, perfectly well attuned to “reading” police powers through that lens,
irrespective of the statutory wording. That said, it would have been a welcome sign
that Parliament recognised its importance by positive reference in this Bill.
Second, it is hard to see what is driving the change – either collectively as a set of
proposals en masse, or individually. With what the problem or social ‘ill’ are these
powers needed to deal? We do not know. There was, unusually, no Green or even
White Paper preceded the Bill – setting out the policy proposals with explanations
and rationales, along with which alternatives that may have been rejected. All we
had were media briefings in November floating possible changes – not all of which
have made their way into this Bill – and, very strangely, an independent Police
Inspectorate report published the day after the Bill. What had irritated the police was
losing the High Court XR case, making it impossible, they said, to police, where large
numbers of protests spring up all over London. Commentators therefore assumed
this Bill would rectify that, allowing one officer to impose directions centrally rather
than – as the Court required – at each separate site. Nothing in the Bill covers this…
so why is it being proposed?
The real problem of this Bill is less the specifics of new offences introduced or
new powers to impose conditions. This is true, generally, of all such expansions
of policing power – and not solely in the realm of public order policing. It is this.
The real risks and threats come not from the expansion in the law but through the
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greater, subliminal expansion in informal policing – bargaining in the shadow of the
law, and claim-making that goes on under conditions of inequality of knowledge and
(for many) presumptions of and acquiescence in power – “they wouldn’t be asking
us to move on if they didn’t have the authority”. It is, in short, the greater room that it
affords police officers, to make demands that may or may not be lawful. The fact that
protesters might well be able to challenge these in court some months later will not
avail them at the time to make their political demands known.
A related problem we see when we consider the widely framed changes is the
alliance of general preventive powers with an expansion of discretion. The addition
of obstructing vehicles going into or leaving Parliament is a case in point. Unlike the
existing two activities – sleeping overnight or playing amplified music – blocking a
car does not involve or require any equipment, making it much easier to arouse an
officer’s ‘reasonable suspicion’ thus to trigger enforcement powers.
All that said, it must be abundantly clear that introducing restrictions upon “noisy”
protests – some, not all it must be noted, provided they are of a sufficient volume or
duration as to cause serious disruption or have a significant impact –  marks quite an
expansion of policing power, what we might in fact typify as an existential threat to
protest, so closely entangled are protests with noise. While some silent vigils have
been held, and some more have taken place primarily with protesters communicating
through placards, it is hard really to think of many causes and of many protesters
who would willingly give up their right to make a noise, and to be noisy. The worry
then is that if the Government is able to persuade Parliament to pass this Bill in this
form, most others will lose their ability in future to persuade anyone of anything, and
that is a loss to us all, from which we might never recover.
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